the Economist: What explains the strength of the German recovery?
-http://www.economist.com/economi ... gth_german_recovery
The question is:
提问：
What explains the strength of the German recovery?
怎解释德国的强悍（经济）复苏？
Aug 29th 2010 by R.A. | The Economist
2010年8月29日 经济学人
Is it sustainable? What lessons should other developed nations draw from this performance?
德国的强势复苏是否持久？其他发达国家能从德国的表现中吸取哪些经验？
Guest contributions: 5
客座发言人：5位
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It comes down to its export orientation
这要归因于出口导向
Harold James our guest wrote on Aug 29th 2010, 18:04 GMT
THE surprisingly strong and successful German recovery is almost entirely a consequence of export demand, in particular from vigorous growth of emerging markets. It is not a uniquely German phenomenon, in that the same pattern of a vigorous export recovery can be seen in other countries with a similar structure (notably Switzerland and Austria), but also some of the dynamic Central European economies (Slovakia or Poland) that see the German development as a model.
德国令世人惊讶的强悍成功复苏几乎全是世界各国出口需求的功劳，尤其是新兴市场的强劲增长功不可没。这不是德国特有的现象，在其他经济结构与德国相似的国家（尤其注意瑞士与奥地利）都能看到相同的强劲出口回升现象，也有一些中欧的发展经济体（斯洛伐克或波兰）把德国的发展看做榜样。
It is eminently sustainable as long as the world economy continues to grow. The major threat is that Germany』s less-export oriented neighbors will worry about the increase of German power and try to apply some sort of brake on German export-led growth.
只要世界经济持续增长，德国的经济复苏肯定能持续下去。主要的威胁来自于出口主导程度不及德国的邻国们，它们会出于对德国力量增强的忧虑而试图制造障碍阻止德国依靠出口实现增长。
Other developed countries should imitate this model, rather than bashing it. Stimulating an economy through a dynamic export sector is not a zero-sum game, but should rather been seen as a way of driving international growth through the well-known principle of the division of labor.
其他发达国家应该效仿德国模式，而不是批评它。通过充满活力的出口这块来刺激经济并不是一个零和游戏，而应该被看做是一个通过有名的劳动分工原则来促进国际经济增长的一种方法。
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It's the lack of leverage
是因为缺少债务
Carmen Reinhart our guest wrote on Aug 29th 2010, 18:24 GMT
This contribution was authored by Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart.
由Carmen Reinhart 和Vincent Reinhart联名撰写
THE answer to Germany』s relatively robust comeback obviously requires a multi-part explanation. We will not attempt that here. But we will, however, focus on one very important dimension of its resilience in the current environment, where recoveries from the crisis, notably in the advanced economies, on the whole, have been disappointing.
德国的相对稳健复苏显然是由多方原因造成的。这里我们不详细讨论这些原因。但是，在当前就发达国家整体而言，危机发生后复苏过程令人失望的大环境下，我们会专注于德国复原过程中的一个非常重要的方面。
We explored the experience of economies surrounding severe financial crises in a paper, After the Fall, presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City』s Jackson Hole Symposium. As we pointed out, Germany was a notable outlier in the now-notorious credit and debt boom of the decade prior to the onset of the subprime crisis. Credit relative to nominal GDP fell about 11 percentage points during 1997-2007; during the same period, credit/GDP rose 80 percentage points for most of the advanced economies. Germany』s gross external debt/GDP fell about 5 percentage points during 2003-2007, while that ratio climbed by about 50% for other advanced economies. Germany』s property market cannot even be loosely characterised as part of the global bubble. In fact, real house prices fell 11% from 1997 to 2007. Unlike Japan, which was the other notable outlier during the credit boom, it did not have the burden of a high public debt. As a consequence, despite rapid increases in government debt since the crisis, Germany does not have a private or public debt overhang of the historic proportions confronting most other advanced economies. It follows that a long and painful deleveraging is not on the horizon.
在堪萨斯城美联储银行Jackson Hole 研讨会上，我们在《衰落之后》这份论文中探讨了不同国家面对严重金融危机时的一些经验。正如我们指出的那样，在次贷危机开始之前，德国在如今已臭名昭著的十年信贷高峰中显然已经是一个偏离常轨的国家。在1997至2007期间，德国贷款跟名义GDP的比值下降了11个百分点；而在同一时期内，贷款跟GDP的比值在大多数发达国家上升了80个百分点。2003至2007年间，德国对外债务总额与GDP的百分比下降了5个百分点，而在别的发达国家，这个比值爬升了约50%。德国房地产市场甚至不能算作是全球沫型经济的一部分。事实上，真实住房价格在1997至2007年间下降了11%。日本是信贷高峰中另一个显而易见偏离常轨的国家，但德国与日本不同，它不必承受巨大公共债务带来的负担。其结果是，尽管危机发生以来政府债务急剧增加，德国并没有造成能够与多数发达国家相提并论的过剩私人或公共债务历史规模。因此眼下漫长而痛苦的减债过程并不是燃眉之急。
In this regard, Germany is the advanced economy counterpart to emerging markets in Asia and Latin America. Those economies also deleveraged during the tranquil booming years (as discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). These emerging markets are not only recovering robustly—some are showing signs of overheating.
在这一点上看来，德国是发达经济体中算得上亚洲和拉美新兴市场竞争对手的国家。那些国家在平静的高峰期间也曾大举减债(见2010年Reihart and Rogoff论文中的讨论)。这些新兴市场不仅复苏稳健——有些还出现了过热的迹象。
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Credit years of reform, wage moderation, and productivity growth
归因于连年（市场化）改革，工资调整以及生产力的提高
Alberto Alesina our guest wrote on Aug 29th 2010, 18:41 GMT
GERMANY is notoriously the most fiscally conservative of the major economies. After having (correctly) allowed its deficit to grow during the recession it has started sooner than other countries on a plan to reduce it. Now it looks like the locomotive of Europe. The US economy with its fiscally irresponsible policies and its deficit of 10% of GDP is sputtering and possibly running into a second recession. This should give pause to those who keep arguing for even more deficit spending in the US and that fiscal prudence would push Europe into a second depression.
德国一直以来作为发达经济体中财政政策最为保守的国家而「恶名远扬」。在萧条期间(正确地)任由赤字（政府支出）增加后，它比其他国家先一步开始计划减少赤字。如今，德国是欧洲经济的火车头。美国经济对财政政策反应不大，还带着相当于GDP 10%的赤字，如今已摇摇欲坠，可能正面临二次探底。这应该足以让那些坚持认为美国应花费更多赤字开支而财政政策将把欧洲推入二次探底深渊的人闭嘴了。
Germany』s recovery seems relatively solid. It is based on some labour market reforms in the last couple of years and a long period of wage moderation. It is also not based on the dubious and at most temporary effect of discretionary public spending increases. It is based on a private sector recovery and increases in productivity. What would sustain growth in Germany and in the rest of Europe is not more public spending but more pro-market structural reforms. If they take place, then growth will be sustainable, unless the US runs into a new recession.
德国的复苏似乎相对稳定。这是建立在过去两年劳工市场改革和长期的工资调整基础上的成果。这也是建立在反复斟酌后增加公共支出基础上的成果，增加公共支出其实算不上是有效的方法，如今的成果充其量只能说是暂时效应。德国的复苏还建立在私有部门复苏和生产力提高的基础上。能让德国和欧洲其他国家持续增长的因素不是公共支出，而是市场化结构改革。如果进行这样的经济结构改革，那么经济增长将会具有可持续性，除非美国经济二次探底。
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Focus on the well-timed drop in the euro
致力于看准时机放弃欧元
Scott Sumner our guest wrote on Aug 29th 2010, 18:47 GMT
PRIOR to the second quarter of 2010, the German recovery was very impressive in terms of job creation, and very unimpressive in terms of real GDP growth. I presume the job creation story has something to do with fiscal stimulus aimed at subsidising work-sharing. I』d like to focus on the sudden acceleration in real GDP growth in the most recent quarter, to an annual rate of 8.8%. Why did German growth accelerate dramatically just as American growth slowed to only 1.6%?
在2010年第二季度之前，德国的复苏在创造就业机会方面让人印象深刻，而在真实GDP增长方面就表现平平。我假定就业机会的增加和以补助工作分担计划为目的的财政刺激方案有一定联系。我想把注意力放在最近这一季度真实GDP突然增加到年度增长率为8.8%这一点上来。就好像美国的经济增长率放缓到只剩1.6%，为什么德国的增长急剧增加呢？
Back in May and June there was a lot of talk about the bleak outlook for the euro zone. Recall that the problems in Greece, and more broadly all the so-called 「PIIGS」, had created doubts about the soundness of banks in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In late May I made this observation in my blog:
在五六月份的时候有很多对欧元区黯淡前景的谈论之声。请大家回想一下，希腊的问题，还有更加广义上的所谓「欧猪五国」，都使得人们对法国德国荷兰的银行坚固性产生了怀疑。五月底我在自己的博客里谈论了这个现象：
So stocks in the heart of the eurozone, the area with many banks that are highly exposed to Greek and Spanish debts, are actually down a bit less (on average) than the US. Perhaps the strong dollar is part of the reason. Perhaps monetary policy has become tighter in the US than Europe.
在欧元区的中心地带，诸多银行很可能面临希腊和西班牙的债务影响。而这里的股票事实上跌幅比美国的还要低一些（就平均水平而言）。也许强势的美元是一个原因。也许美国的货币政策比欧洲的更紧。
The loss of confidence in the euro led to a rush for safety, and the demand for dollars rose sharply in the spring of the year. Because the interest rate in America is stuck at 0.25%, and the Fed is reluctant to use unconventional policy tools, there was no policy action taken to offset the increase in the demand for dollars. Monetary policy became effectively tighter.
对欧元丧失信心导致人们盲目寻找安全的港湾，今年春天美元需求急剧上升。由于美国利率被卡在了0.25%，而美联储对使用非常规政策工具始终心存顾虑，所以没有出台相应政策来抵消美元需求增加所带来的影响。有效的货币政策收得更紧了。
The results were predictable. Whereas the euro had traded in the range of 1.35 to 1.45 to the dollar in the first four months of 2010, the exchange rate has dropped to the 1.20 to 1.32 range since the beginning of May. Because Germany has an export-based economy, this contributed to a fast rise in output. Just the opposite happened in the US, where a recovery that looked on track in the first quarter of 2010, suddenly stalled in May and June. Some have argued that the winding down of fiscal stimulus caused the recovery to weaken in the US. But spending rose briskly in the second quarter; the problem was a widening of the trade deficit.
结果是可以预见的。在2010年的头四个月里，欧元对美元的汇率维持在1.35至1.45之间，而自五月初以来，汇率跌至1.20至1.32。由于德国是个依赖于出口的经济体，这样的变化使得经济产出快速增加。而在美国情况相反，2010年第一季度看似上了轨道的经济复苏在五月六月嘎然而止。一些人认为财政刺激的松懈削弱了美国的复苏过程。但第二季度的支出迅速增加；问题是贸易赤字正在扩大。
Many economists overestimate the importance of real shocks in the business cycle of large diversified economies, and underestimate the importance of monetary shocks. That』s not to say that real shocks are unimportant. If the Greek crisis ends up costing German taxpayers a great deal of money, then it may be a net negative for German welfare, even with the short term boost to growth. But if we are focusing purely on the business cycle, then shocks to the supply and demand for money (including expectations of future changes) are the primary determinant of the pace of recovery.
许多经济学家高估了大型多元化经济体商业周期中实体经济震动的重要性，却低估了货币震动的重要性。这并不是说实体经济震动不重要。如果希腊危机以花掉德国纳税人大量资金收场，那么德国经济总的来说损失了福利，即使短期内促进了经济增长也不相干。但是如果我们只是单纯地把注意力放在商业周期上，那么货币供求的震动（包括对货币未来变化的期望）就是决定经济复苏速度的主导因素。
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Good policy, fundamentals, and luck
优良的政策，扎实的基础，还有运气
Beatrice Weder our guest wrote on Sep 1st 2010, 15:48 GMT
WHAT a difference four months make. Four months ago the question on economics blogs was whether Germany was ever going to grow. It was accused of not living up to its responsibility to the European/global community due to its dedication to savings and addiction to exports. The announcement of a fiscal consolidation was considered extremely selfish and ultimately counterproductive. Now the world looks on with astonishment and wonders why Germany is growing faster than the US. Why?
四个月时间足以改变很多东西。四个月前，经济博客上的问题是：德国经济到底会不会增长。德国被认为没有对欧洲/全球共同体尽到责任而受到指责， 这都是因为它对储蓄的热衷以及对出口的过度依赖。当它宣告要采取财政巩固政策的时候，被认为自私到了极点，而且是不可能达到预定的经济目标。现在世界陷入了震惊，还为德国比美国增幅更快而感到纳闷。到底是什么原因产生这样的增幅呢？
Not because of the exchange rate. Some 40% of Germany』s trade is in Europe where (nominal) exchange rates play no role. Trade outside the euro area will be positively affected by the depreciation of the euro but this is never an immediate effect. The recovery of exports in spring coincides with the pressure on the euro but is caused by stronger foreign demand for German-type products. If you doubt this, look at Switzerland, which exports similar products and saw its exports jump in spring—at the same time as the exchange rate appreciated massively.
不是因为汇率。德国贸易中约40%在欧洲内部进行，这里没有汇率的角色。欧元区以外的贸易将受到欧元贬值的正面影响，但这不可能起到立竿见影的效果。春季的出口回升和欧元的升值压力不期而遇，但前者是由国外对德国制造的产品的强烈需求而引起的。如果你对这一点表示怀疑，那么看看瑞士和奥地利这两个例子，瑞士和奥地利出口类似的工业机械产品，在春季出口量也节节高升——和汇率大幅升值在同一时间。
The more important part of the story is actually not about net exports. The news that did not make the news is that the growth contribution of domestic demand in Germany was larger that of net exports. Domestic demand contributed 1.3% and net exports only 0.8% in the second quarter (quarter-on-quarter) to growth. In the first quarter the relative contribution of domestic demand was even stronger (1.6% domestic versus -1.1% foreign). So the real question is why domestic demand is growing so un-Germanly. There are three parts to the answer:
整件事中更重要的部分其实不是净出口。没有成为新闻的新闻是，德国国内需求对增长的贡献要大于总出口。国内需求在第二季度（同比）增长中的贡献为1.3%， 而净出口的贡献仅为0.8%。第一季度中，国内需求的相对贡献甚至还要大些(国内1.6% VS 国外-1.1%)。因此真正的问题是，为什么国内需求以这么不符合德国一贯作风的方式增长。答案分为三个部分：
First: Policy was right. Labour markets were flexibilised and the response to the crisis was well designed. In particular the combination of a continued fiscal stimulus and a credible commitment to consolidation struck the right balance.
第一:政策是正确的。劳工市场更加灵活化了，应对危机的办法设计得非常出众。尤其是混合了持续的财政刺激和扎实的巩固政策的应对方案，其中的平衡把握得非常好。
Second: Fundamentals were ok. There was no bubble in real estate, and no private sector leveraging. The corporate sector has undergone a decade of fitness training—outsourcing, offshoring, and restructuring—to regain competitiveness. It has played an important role in maintaining employment through the slump—with some state support but also with contributions from employers and employees—and was ready to expand production as soon as demand picked up. It´s worth mentioning that the banking sector has not undergone the same fitness test and is still in poor shape. This may well be a drag over the next years.
第二：基础良好。房地产市场没有泡沫，也没有私营部门的债务。企业历经了10年的健康训练以便重获竞争力——这些措施包括外部采购，离岸外包，机构重组。企业在维持萧条期就业率方面起到了重要作用(获得了一些国家的支持，但也有雇主和雇员的功劳),并且只要需求一旦上来就准备开始扩大生产规模。值得一提的是，银行部门还没有进行类似的健康测试，仍旧处于千头万绪之中。这在未来两年内也许会成为德国经济的累赘。
Third: Chance. Part of the story is a rebound after a sudden stop in production in 2009. Some of it is a lagged effect of the resurgence in worldwide demand for capital goods, which Germany happens to produce. Some of it is pure coincidence, such as a weather-related construction spike.
第三：机会。在2009年生产量突然停止后曾经出现过一次反弹。部分反弹的原因是由于世界资本货物需求回升带来的滞后影响，而德国正是生产资本货物的国家。还有部分原因纯粹是巧合，例如受天气因素而出现的建筑高峰期。
Overall, there is certainly a more complicated picture than the simplistic demand story that was so popular four months ago. But it does not follow from this that now Germany is on the path to high growth. The medium-run growth potential has been estimated between 1 and 1.5%. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise if in another four months Germany's growth rate has decelerated and the blame game resumed.
总体而言，德国经济之所以能够强劲复苏，背后的原因当然不会是四个月前大受欢迎的「（出口）需求论」那么简单。但这不是说如今德国正踏上高速增长的路途。据预计，德国的中期增长潜力为1%至1.5%。因此，如果四个月后德国的增长率有所放缓，然后重又上演相互指责的拉锯游戏，一点也不要大惊小怪。
德国的地产市场完全没有沾染世界泡沫大潮，楼价不升反跌；德国民众对 炒股、碌卡 都不太热衷，习惯储钱入银行。
稳重踏实的行事风格，是在逆市中发威猛飙的王牌。
德国国内传媒对自己的成绩，并没有像英美那样用夸张的词语大幅报道，反而相当谨慎，甚至有点悲观。 德国现在，以西柏林市中心Charlottenburg区的一间待售二手楼为例，大家可以click入去睇睇个套间的实景相片：
http://www.findaproperty.com/displayprop.aspx?edid=09&salerent=0&pid=6486324
84方，10万欧元以内，临江三线（一线临江其实会有好严重的潮湿问题），绿地充足，步行2分钟可到Spree河畔，步行5分钟可到Charlottenburg公园。
柏林一个护理中专毕业的普通护士仔，月薪大概2千欧元，月支出大概800欧元，独力工作七年就可买起同等于这间屋价位的套间。而且七年之内楼价都极稳定，不升反跌。 本帖最後由 使君子 於 2010-11-5 21:58 編輯
还要考虑到一个好严重的问题：相比起工资，我们大陆的物价其实高得好离谱。
大陆平均月入是两千人币，德国平均也是两千欧元，但问题是，人家德国超市的苹果是卖个七银钱（欧元）两斤，我们大陆是卖到14文（人币）两斤，所以我们大陆民众的钱是不见使的。
再加上我们大陆的苹果生产质量是相当糟糕的，所以我们出产的苹果的本质价值实际上可能连人家四分之一都不值。 由于人币出现升值的势头，这意味着我们大陆民众可以用更实惠的价格购买质量优秀的进口产品，而不用啃贵价国产垃圾。
那班大陆狗官，正正是意识到这一点，眼红别国，不能容忍别国赚自己国民的钱，干脆自己拿起屠刀先宰割自己的国民，样样都加几倍价，令民众彻底丧失购买力。
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